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RESPONSES FROM THE FRONTLINE: 
HOW ORGANISATIONS AND STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRATS DEAL WITH 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Dorte Caswell and Matilde Høybye-Mortensen*
Abstract
Economic sanctions have gained more political legitimacy and are being more widely 
used as a tool to improve the willingness of unemployed welfare recipients to participate 
in activities within the framework of active labour market policy (ALMP). Th e focus 
of this article is the use of economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients in Denmark. 
Quantitative analyses show a substantial increase in the use of economic sanctions 
in Denmark, including sanctions on those who are categorised as having problems in 
addition to unemployment. In this article we will direct our attention to responses from 
both the organisational and individual level regarding the implementation of sanctions. 
Empirical material consists of interviews with managers and frontline social workers in 
municipalities with a high number of sanctions. We argue that organisations matter in 
shaping street-level behaviour, resulting in substantial diff erences in the use of sanctions 
from one municipality to another.
Keywords: economic sanctions; organisational practices; social work; street-level 
organisation; unemployed
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions have gained more political legitimacy and are being more widely 
used as a tool to improve the willingness of unemployed clients to participate in 
activities within the framework of active labour market policy (ALMP) in Denmark 
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(Caswell et al. 2011). Reforms in many countries have shift ed the way in which welfare 
states treat citizens who are unable to participate in the labour market (Soldatic 
and Pini 2012). In Denmark the reforms have gradually widened the target group 
for the active programmes, increased the requirements placed on the unemployed, 
introduced harsher penalties for their failure to meet these requirements, and 
placed greater emphasis on compliance (Bigby and Files 2003). Th e use of economic 
sanctions on cash benefi t recipients is central to this development. Quantitative 
analyses show a substantial increase in the use of economic sanctions in Denmark, 
including sanctions on those who are categorised as having problems in addition to 
unemployment (Caswell et al. 2011). In 2006, 6.8 per cent of clients categorised as not 
ready for the labour market were sanctioned. In 2013, 13.5 per cent of clients in this 
category received a sanction (jobindsats.dk). Th e focus of this article is on the use of 
economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients with multiple barriers to work. Th ese 
clients are sometimes referred to in the literature as the ‘hard-to-serve’ or the ‘hard-
to-employ’ (Butler et al. 2012; Soss et al. 2011a).
Sanctions are administered by street-level bureaucrats working in welfare 
organisations; a group of employees who are considered to have a major impact on 
policy, since they are delivering the services to the citizens (Lipsky 1980). Th e street-
level bureaucrats’ room for manoeuvre is, however, like the hole in the doughnut, 
surrounded by a belt of restrictions (Dworkin 1978: 31). Th e restrictions are 
imposed from national, local and operational levels, giving rise to the organisational 
perspective on street-level bureaucracy (Brodkin 2008). In Denmark there are 
substantial diff erences in the use of sanctions from one municipality to another, a 
diff erence which is not immediately explicable by diff erences in the characteristics 
of the unemployed (Caswell and Høybye-Mortensen 2011). Th us, the municipal 
organisations seem to have an impact on shaping street-level behaviour in imposing 
sanctions. Th is argument is in line with the fi ndings of Soss, Fording and Schram 
(2011a; 2011b), who see sanctions as organised practice, which means that sanctions 
are refl ecting organisational characteristics and not merely client characteristics. Th e 
ambition of this article is to explore the point made by Soss et al. (2011b) that few 
studies have paid attention to the diff erent aspects of organisational structure, process 
and culture in relation to the use of sanctions. Th ey argue that: ‘Th e omission is striking 
because it ignores the obvious fact that sanction decisions are made in the context 
of organizational routines, by actors who occupy specifi c organizational positions 
(…) scholars have failed to address one of the most distinctive and critical features 
of contemporary poverty governance: the interplay of systems for disciplining clients 
(e.g., sanctions) and systems for disciplining service providers (e.g., performance 
management)’ (Soss et al. 2011b: 205).
Th e performance measures in the Danish case are somewhat diff erent from and less 
harsh than in the North American case, and we therefore want to investigate how this 
works in a diff erent setting, namely the Danish setting. A substantial part of literature 
on the use of economic sanctions has focused on welfare recipients and the eff ects of 
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these sanctions in terms of welfare exit (Rosholm and Svarer 2008; Svarer 2011; Van der 
Klaauw and Van Ours 2013). In this article we contribute to the research on economic 
sanctions in three diff erent ways. First, we contribute to the limited literature on the 
interplay between sanctioning systems aimed at clients and systems for disciplining 
service providers (in Jobcentres and Cash Benefi t Offi  ces) as pointed out above by Soss 
et al. Secondly, we explore economic sanctions in a rather diff erent setting, that is, in 
a universalistic welfare state, where benefi ts are considered generous and in a country 
with a long tradition of ALMP. Th irdly, but related to the fi rst two ways, we explore 
economic sanctions in a diff erent governance setting. Whereas the employment service 
in the US is primarily run by private providers who are at risk of going out of business if 
they lose customers, the employment services in Denmark are run by municipalities as 
essential organisational units within the Danish welfare state. However, municipalities 
are potentially at risk of losing the task of managing the employment services if they 
are perceived, at a national level, to be performing poorly (Th uesen et al. 2009).
Previous research has shown that the implementation of ALMP policies in the 
Danish municipalities has tended to be more in line with a human capital and social 
integration approach than with a disciplining and harsher work-fi rst approach (Larsen 
2001; Larsen and Bredgaard 2009). In a recent Danish study only 13 per cent of the 
caseworkers across the Danish municipalities gave highest priority to ‘using economic 
sanctions when clients fail to appear at meetings in the jobcentre’ (Jørgensen et al. 
2014). Our expectations would be that, given the long tradition of ALMP in Denmark 
(Larsen 2013), the implementation of sanctions will co-exist with a focus on social 
integration and human capital, making the sanction practices less paternalistic in 
Denmark than elsewhere, especially for the hard-to-employ.
Our two research questions are, fi rst, how does the implementation of a sanctioning 
regime reshape the conditions of work in the municipal employment services? And, 
second, how do workers and managers respond to these conditions in practice?
2. THE ORGANISATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRACIES
In this section we outline the literature on street-level bureaucrats ‒ and the 
organisations they inhibit ‒ in order to develop a theoretical framework for the 
analysis. A central point in the literature on street-level bureaucracy is that policy is 
not created by politicians but rather translated and realised at the very frontline of 
the welfare state (Lipsky 1980). If the actions of street-level bureaucrats diverge from 
national policies, it is arguable that this poses a problem for democracy. Numerous 
studies have followed this line of thought and have attempted to explain why and 
how this seems to be the case (Hupe and Hill 2007; Sandfort 2000 and many others). 
Street-level bureaucrats, by defi nition, have room for discretion. Th eir discretionary 
role is central to the study of street-level bureaucracies. However, previous research 
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shows diff ering approaches as to how to view the application of discretion in a welfare 
benefi t context. While initially the literature focused on the shared dilemmas of street-
level bureaucrats across several areas of welfare provision (Lipsky 1980), later works 
have focused on other ways of understanding or explaining the divergence between 
national policy and welfare provision at the frontline. Some studies have focused 
on individual diff erences between street-level bureaucrats in relation to political 
preferences or disagreement with national policy (May and Winter 2007; Winter 
2002). A more recent stream of research on street-level bureaucracy focuses on the role 
of organisations in analysing street-level behaviour (Brodkin 2011; Soss et al. 2011b). 
Th e organisational approach ‘begins, not at the policy level, but at the organizational-
level, examining what they do in street-level practice, why, and what these practices 
produce’ (Brodkin 2008: 322). A central argument in this line of research is that new 
public management strategies, such as performance measures and other forms of 
accountability, shape the coping strategies of the street-level bureaucrats in diverse 
and complex ways. Studying welfare sanctions in the US, Soss et al. (2011a; 2011b) 
point out that a traditional street-level perspective on the use of sanctions may lead 
to misinterpretation. Perceiving the street-level bureaucrat as a policy-maker may 
lead to criticism from several sides. At one end of the spectrum, the critics may say 
that frontline workers play a crucial role when they fail to implement the economic 
sanctions properly. Critics from a diff erent part of the spectrum may argue that 
tough punitive tools in the hands of frontline workers may lead these workers to use 
them in unjust and arbitrary ways. Soss et al. argue that when it comes to analysing 
sanctions, it is problematic to omit the organisational level in relation to street-level 
behaviour. Th ey claim that ‘…organisational forces can shape worker autonomy and 
channel behaviour at the frontline’ and further, that ‘…organisational routines, tools, 
norms, incentives, information systems and categories of understanding function as 
mechanisms of social control that shape the use of discretion in predictable ways’ 
(Soss et al. 2011b: 225). In other words, the frontline worker inevitably has room 
for discretion, but the organisations infl uence the use of discretion at the frontline. 
For instance, Soss et al. (2011a; 2011b) found that, in the case of TANF (Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families), the use of sanctions could be explained by diff erent 
mechanisms. One such mechanism was that due to the lack of other off ers social 
workers turned to the threat of sanctions in order to achieve compliance from the 
client. Rather than believing in the actual eff ect of the sanction, it was seen as a 
result of A leading to B; the threat of a sanction, in the hope of compliance, resulted 
in actual sanctions when compliance did not occur. Discretion plays an important 
part when economic sanctions are imposed on those who have substantial problems 
in addition to unemployment. Th us, discretion is not only defi ned by street-level 
bureaucrats, but also by street-level organisations. Soss et al.  (2011b) argue that 
caseworkers are ‘ambivalent actors caught in the cross-pressure of competing values, 
identities and organizational forces (…) most express a strong commitment to social 
service ideals and value their identities as providers who are responsive to clients’ 
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needs’ (Soss et al. 2011b: 291). Th ey conclude: ‘…sanctioning is more than a response 
to client behaviours and characteristics and more than an individual action taken by 
a case manager. Sanctioning is an organized practice, and as a result, the frequency 
and incidence of sanctions depend on organizational forces’ (Soss et al. 2011b: 227). 
Taking a closer look at the organisational side of sanctioning, practice seems relevant. 
In a brilliant study of encounters in French welfare offi  ces, Dubois (2010) presents 
a similar argument: ‘Th rough the institutions, collective norms are reproduced; the 
individual’s rights and duties towards society are distributed’ (Dubois 2010: 183). Th us, 
the argument here is that not only that norms and tools play a role at an institutional 
level, but they must also be analysed with an awareness of the role of organisations.
In this article, we direct our attention to responses from both the organisational 
and individual level regarding the implementation of sanctions. First, we focus 
our attention on how the use of sanctions is infl uenced by external pressures, such 
as performance measurement systems and bench-marking. Th e organisational 
infrastructure must fi rst be outlined. By organisational infrastructure, we mean the 
formalised division of work and the physical layout of offi  ces and tasks. Secondly, the 
internal conditions for imposing sanctions and the ways in which front line workers 
and managers respond to this are analysed. We focus here on the way in which 
managers and caseworkers explain and justify the active use of economic sanctions.
3. SETTING: THE DANISH UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEM
Denmark maintains a high level of social security in the form of generous and universal 
access to welfare benefi ts combined with a fl exible labour market. For this reason the 
country has received international attention and has been viewed as a positive example 
of active labour market policies (ALMP) (Kvist and Pedersen 2007; Svarer 2011). In 
European countries welfare benefi ts are frequently used to support the long-term 
unemployed. Th is is also the case in Denmark. Th e most important welfare benefi t for 
marginalised people is a cash benefi t. Th is is a temporary, monthly benefi t, which is 
conditional on a set of eligibility criteria and is means-tested. In Denmark clients stay 
on this cash benefi t for a long time, sometimes for many years. According to a recent 
policy document published by the Ministry of Employment, 15 per cent of cash benefi t 
recipients have been receiving the benefi t for more than fi ve years, while 6 per cent 
have been cash benefi t recipients for ten years or more (Ministry of Employment 2013).
3.1. POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN REGARDS TO ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS
Th rough political reform, Denmark has seen a gradual but substantial widening of the 
target group for economic sanctions. Partly based on research (such as Rosholm and 
Svarer 2008; Svarer 2011), the Danish authorities have widened the use of economic 
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sanctions with the assumption that these are an eff ective tool for motivating 
unemployed people to get back into employment.
Th e use of sanctions has been promoted at a national policy level since the mid-
1990s through numerous reforms, legislation and political rhetoric. Th e beginning 
of 2013 saw yet another reform of the cash benefi t system (Ministry of Employment 
2013) which refl ects political confi dence in the positive eff ects of economic sanctions. 
It introduces harsher economic sanctions and focuses on enhancing the clients’ 
transition into work. Sanctions are identifi ed as the solution for a certain hypothetical 
group of clients, that is, those who ‘systematically avoid the demands placed upon 
them’ (Ministry of Employment 2013). Th e many ALMP reforms in Denmark have 
not only reformed the substance of policy, but equally importantly, the reforms have 
been technical and focused on the operational level of how policy is translated into 
practice in street level organisations (Larsen 2011). Specifi c performance measures 
have been implemented alongside these reforms and are now important tools for 
politicians and managers (Hammerschmid et al. 2013). For instance, the frequency of 
interaction between frontline workers in the Jobcentre and cash benefi t recipients has 
been prescribed in legislation and the categories used to defi ne the type of measures 
have been defi ned by the National Labour Market Authority (Caswell 2013). Th ese 
categories are closely intertwined with the type and likelihood of economic sanctions 
aimed at the client.
According to a study from 2011 (Caswell et al. 2011), 11 per cent of all cash benefi t 
recipients are sanctioned (around 15,000 individuals) and around 40 per cent of them 
are subject to two or more separate sanctions. Th e study also showed that, compared 
to cash benefi t recipients as a whole, those who receive an economic sanction are 
more likely to be younger and male, with little or no education. According to the 
website jobindsats.dk, which contains information from the National Labour Market 
Authority, 21 per cent of all cash benefi t recipients were subject to one or more 
sanctions in 2013 (jobindsats.dk). Th e vast majority of these sanctions are ‘periodical 
sanctions’ (Caswell et al. 2011 and jobindsats.dk). Th is means that the cash benefi t 
is stopped from the moment a client refuses an off er, fails to attend a meeting or in 
other ways fails to live up to demands placed on them by the welfare system. Th us, 
in eff ect, the social security safety net is removed from the client until they change 
their behaviour to meet the requirements imposed by the Jobcentre. In next section 
we illustrate how diff erent sanctions are related to diff erent types of non-compliance 
with the requirements of the Jobcentre.
3.2. THE MUNICIPALITIES ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS
Danish municipalities play a very important part in delivering welfare services 
as they are in charge of implementing national legislation. Danish municipalities 
have wide spread autonomy and can collect taxes. Local diff erences are thus to be 
expected. Th e employment services, however, are one of the most heavily regulated 
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areas. National legislation contains rules guiding the application of discretion 
as well as the organisation of the municipal employment services. We return to 
this later in the article. Th e use of economic sanctions cannot be separated from 
discretionary practices at the municipal level. Th e legislation states that, when it 
comes to clients with problems in addition to unemployment, the municipality 
has to make an individual assessment as to whether sanctions should be used. In 
the legislative documents the ‘municipality’ is always named as the implementing 
actor, and not, for instance, the caseworker. Th e 98 Danish municipalities show 
signifi cant diff erences in their use of economic sanctions, even when background 
factors such as the unemployment rate, the population’s age profi le and educational 
level are taken into account, indicating that discretion either at organisational or 
individual level, is being applied diff erently across municipalities. If the frontline 
workers at the municipal Jobcentre fi nd a client to be ready to participate in a 
specifi c activation project, then the client is required to participate. Consequently, 
active labour market measures and the target group for them must be defi ned and 
developed at the municipal level. Sanctions are directed at non-compliance. For 
clients categorised as ready for the labour market, compliance entails accepting job 
off ers and job seeking activities. Compliance is, however, also required of clients 
who have problems in addition to unemployment. In these cases the focus is not 
on the client applying for jobs, but rather on the client’s willingness to participate 
in meetings with frontline workers at the Jobcentre or in activation projects aimed 
at dealing with any problems that might prevent them from being available for 
work. Aft er January 2014, cash benefi t recipients are, by defi nition, either ready for 
the labour market, ready for education or ready for active measures to overcome 
barriers for labour market participation. Th is means that it is now impossible for 
the Jobcentre to defi ne clients as ‘temporarily passive’, which previously existed as 
a category for those unemployed clients whom any kind of activation was believed 
counterproductive. Th e implication of this is that all clients, including those with 
substantial problems other than unemployment can be sanctioned, if they have been 
given an active off er deemed to be appropriate for them.
4. METHODOLOGY
Th is paper is based on interviews with managers and caseworkers working with cash 
benefi t recipients in municipal Jobcentres. Th e data stems from a qualitative study 
of two municipalities which both have a high level of sanctions compared to other 
Danish municipalities.
Th e qualitative study included 18 interviews: fi ve interviews with management 
and staff  in both municipalities and eight interviews with cash benefi t recipients 
who had repeatedly experienced economic sanctions. We approached management 
in the selected Jobcentres to ask for their participation. Th e municipalities were 
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informed that we had chosen them because of their high level of sanctions. Both 
of the selected municipalities agreed to participate.1 In both municipalities all 
relevant managers were interviewed. A number of caseworkers were also selected 
for interview. Th is selection was done in cooperation with the management at the 
municipality. Th e caseworkers selected were selected on the basis of their work 
experience in dealing with the particular group of cash benefi t recipients we 
were interested in (cash benefi t recipients with problems beside unemployment). 
Th e interviews were conducted in the offi  ces of the interviewee. Th ey were semi-
structured and focused on factors in the municipal landscape that we expected 
would play a role regarding the use of economic sanctions. Th ese factors were local 
political priorities, municipal organisation, the logic of practice in the municipalities 
including attitudes of the street-level bureaucrats towards clients, ALMP and 
economic sanctions. In the diff erent interviews we focused, in particular, on how 
economic sanctions were perceived and used in everyday practice by both managers 
and caseworkers in the two municipalities. Th e data also included observation at 
an activation project aimed at this particular group of benefi t recipients. During 
the observation (one day in each project) informal conversations were conducted 
with the professionals at the activation projects regarding attitudes towards and 
the use of economic sanctions in the municipality. Th e interviews conducted in 
Municipalities A and B were systematically coded for phrases where the use of 
economic sanctions was described, and in particular for how the diff erent actors 
explained what organisational trademarks made the use of economic sanctions 
possible. All accounts of how economic sanctions were used, including justifi cations 
and explanations, have been included. By analysing the interviews we identifi ed the 
organisational infrastructure and the procedures used when using sanctions. In the 
fi ndings section below, we present this data using quotes that represent patterns 
found across the interviews.
4.1. THE TWO MUNICIPALITIES
Th e two chosen municipalities (A and B) are not signifi cantly diff erent from other 
municipalities on any observable variables other than their high level of sanctions. 
Th ey are located in two opposite corners of Denmark. In terms of population both are 
slightly smaller than the average Danish municipality. One is located in a more rural 
part of Denmark, while the other is closer to the capital and thus defi ned as a non-
rural municipality. Both municipalities have a lower number of cash benefi t recipients 
per 100 citizens than the national average. In addition, they both have a substantially 
higher than average level of sanctions.
1 One manager even said in the initial contact that ‘obviously you want to see how we do, as we are 
doing so well when it comes to sanctions.’
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Table 1. Municipalities A and B in relation to the rest of Denmark
A B Country average
Population 40,400 52,500 55,000
Rural/non-rural rural non-rural
Number of cash benefi t 
recipients per 100 citizens
1.7 1.2 2.3
Level of sanctions 34% 24% 11%
Sources: Data from www.noegletal.dk/ provided by the Ministry of Economic Aff airs and the Interior 
and www.jobindsats.dk/ provided by the National Labour Market Authority.
It is not possible to generalise from this analysis to the use of economic sanctions 
in Denmark as a whole. However, it does enable us to identify some of the internal 
organisational structures and responses from managers and workers regarding the 
frequent use of economic sanctions. Due to the qualitative nature of the study as well 
as the chosen perspective on the use of sanctions, this analysis is mainly explorative. 
Th e two municipal organisations that were selected are not representative of the 
entirety of Danish municipalities, but rather represent types of organisations in 
which the use of economic sanctions is relatively high. Looking at comparative cases 
of municipalities with low rates of sanctions would undoubtedly have strengthened 
our empirical design. However, this was unfortunately not possible in the study and it 
limits the extent to which we can make general conclusions.
5. FINDINGS
Th e structure of the fi ndings section of the article is as follows. First, we analyse how 
the use of sanctions is infl uenced by external pressures by looking at information 
systems and performance measures that support the use of economic sanctions 
towards cash benefi t recipients in the municipalities. Secondly, we analyse the 
internal conditions for imposing sanctions and the ways in which front line workers 
and managers respond in the two municipalities.
5.1. EXTERNAL PRESSURE: INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Th ere is external pressure from the regional and the national level on municipalities 
when it comes to the use of sanctions. In this part of the analysis we take a closer 
look at the information systems and performance measures that support the use of 
economic sanctions on the cash benefi t recipients in the municipalities. Th is external 
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pressure is applied on all municipalities, but it is outside the bounds of this analysis to 
go beyond the two selected municipalities.
Th e regional authorities in Denmark monitor the municipalities and publish 
the ranking of municipalities in terms of number of sanctions. Th e interviewees 
refer to these rankings. One caseworker said: ‘Th e attendance register goes directly 
to the administrative group who sanction. I don’t even get told. It is incredibly 
effi  cient and clever (…) it is way more systematised here, so that is why we are 
placed so well in the statistics [that is, we have a high sanction rate]’ (Caseworker, 
Jobcentre B). To be ‘placed well’ in the statistics means that they are ‘at the top 
of the list’ (see Table 1) when comparing how many sanctions the municipalities 
impose on their cash benefi t recipients. Both municipalities (A and B) are at the 
top of the list in their respective regions because they sanction more frequently 
than other municipalities in the region. Th is is considered good and desirable in 
municipalities A and B.
According to regulations, an assessment must be made by the municipality prior 
to any sanctions, assessing whether the sanctions are likely to promote the client’s 
availability for work or attendance. Th e legislation does not specifi cally state that 
sanctions should be imposed whenever a cash benefi t recipient fails to attend an 
activation project, an interview at the Jobcentre or even if the cash benefi t recipient 
rejects a job off er. Discretion is inherent in these decisions. Th is is, however, not 
how the Head of Department in Municipality A sees it: ‘…all of them [the diff erent 
types of sanctions] (…) those sanctions are not discretionary. It says “HAVE TO” in 
the legislation (…) we do not use discretion in that way, unless of course there is a 
legitimate reason for the client not turning up.’
Th e interpretation of the legislation applied in this municipality only allows for 
the caseworkers’ right to exercise discretion in the assessment of legitimate reasons 
for not doing something. It excludes the element of discretion from the assessment of 
whether sanctioning promotes availability for work or active measures. Th e municipal 
interpretation of the legislation thus becomes decisive for the cash benefi t recipient’s 
risk of sanctioning.
Th e legislation states the obligation to use discretion in each case where sanctioning 
is considered, while at the regional level eff orts are made to promote the municipal 
use of economic sanctions. Th e records from the municipalities are transferred to 
a national database and used for analyses. Th is data is published on the website 
jobindsats.dk. Th e website enables the comparison of individual municipalities with 
a few mouse clicks. As an example, one of the municipalities in this study has been 
compared to the neighbouring municipality (see Table 2, below). Th e comparison 
clearly shows a substantial diff erence between the levels of sanctions in the two 
municipalities. In our case, Municipality A, almost 40 per cent of the unemployed 
clients (Match 1) who were considered to be ready for the labour market were subject 
to a sanction in 2011, compared to 13 per cent of a similar group of unemployed clients 
in the municipality right next to them.
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Table 2. Level of sanctions in Municipality A in relation to the neighbour municipality, 2011
Proportion of unemployed subject 
to a sanction (percentage)
Municipality A Match 1 39.8
Match 2 22.6
Match 3 5.7
Municipality in the same region, 
situated right next to A
Match 1 13.0
Match 2 18.8
Match 3 3.6
Note: Match Category 1 (ready to work), Match Category 2 (ready for active measures), and Match 
Category 3 (temporarily passive).
Th e regional authority uses this data when they communicate with the municipalities 
about their implementation of ALMP, including the use of economic sanctions. 
Th e data enables the municipal level of sanctioning to be used as a performance 
measure, although without set targets to be met. Th e regional authority monitors 
and advises the municipalities within the region on their implementation of ALMP. 
Th e strong signals from both the regional and national levels on sanctioning as a 
desired practice may cause some municipalities to play it safe. In cases where the 
municipality is uncertain about the rules, they might choose to use a sanction 
whenever a client is absent. Th e database can be seen as a form of ‘naming and 
shaming’ (Hammerschmid et al. 2013) to make public the number of sanctions used 
by the municipal organisations.
Th e use of economic sanctions can be seen to have a double eff ect: not only is the 
client sanctioned fi nancially for non-compliance, but the street-level organisation is 
also sanctioned through a public ranking system and varying degrees of pressure from 
regional and national authorities. Th e two municipalities in this study did, however, 
comply with the intentions from central government. A caseworker from Municipality 
A said: ‘It [state regulation and reimbursement] aff ects the management extremely. 
Th at is the only thing on their mind and obviously it infl uences the caseworkers. Th ere 
are many things you wouldn’t do if you didn’t have to. Th e system has become so much 
more dynamic. Th e money comes from “above” and the attitudes are transferred 
downwards. It is tremendously important’ (Caseworker, Municipality A).
Diff erent kinds of performance measures are used to promote the implementation 
of ALMP. One of these is the use of fi nancial reimbursement linked to specifi c activities 
in the organisation. Th e legislative demand to have meetings with clients every three 
months (timeliness) is one, and the degree to which clients are given activation off ers 
(degree of activation), is another. Th e level of compliance with this also diff ers across 
municipalities. In these highly sanctioning municipalities their approach seems to 
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mirror the intentions from central government. A caseworker says: ‘Our municipality 
has benefi ted fi nancially on reimbursement from the state because the demands for 
activity has matched our municipal vision that you must “give to get something”’ 
(Caseworker, Municipality A). Another caseworker refers to the performance measure 
of timeliness as a reason for the increase in the use of sanctions: ‘Timeliness. Th ere 
has to be an explanation as to why we have not had that meeting with the client or 
given an activation off er to him or her. Th ere are more demands and thus more ways 
of not complying. Th at is why there are more situations in which you can sanction’ 
(Caseworker, Municipality B).
5.2. INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
In this second part of the analysis we focus on the internal conditions for imposing 
sanctions and ways in which front line workers and managers respond to this in the 
two municipalities. Again, we initially take a look at the overall structure in all Danish 
municipalities before taking a closer look at the two highly sanctioning municipalities 
in this study.
Th ree organisational units are important: the Jobcentres, the Cash Benefi t Offi  ces 
and the diff erent activation projects. It was decided by law in 2007 that the Jobcentres 
and the Cash Benefi t Offi  ces should be physically separated. As a consequence, the 
Jobcentres carry out the assessment of the client and the Cash Benefi t Offi  ces handle 
benefi t payments and impose the economic sanctions (withholding benefi t payments). 
However, there is room for discretion at municipal level as to how the competences 
and tasks are divided between the Jobcentres and the Cash Benefi t Offi  ces. Th e typical 
organisation of the work in the 98 Danish Jobcentres means that caseworkers in the 
Jobcentres make the initial assessment of the client’s potential in the employment 
market. Th e assessment ranks from Match Category 1 (ready to work), Match 
Category 2 (ready for active measures), and Match Category 3 (temporarily passive).2 
Th e caseworkers at the Jobcentre are also in charge of follow-up interviews and 
transferring clients to diff erent types of activation.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical organisation of work when a sanction is imposed. 
Once a client is appointed to an activation project, the professionals responsible will 
monitor the client’s attendance and report any absence to the Jobcentre or the Cash 
Benefi t Offi  ce.
2 With the implementation of the recent cash benefi t reform in 2014, the match categorisation tool 
has been discontinued. Th ere is now a diff erent way of categorising the cash benefi t recipient as 
either ready for work, ready for education, or ready for active measures. Th is may enhance the 
opportunities for sanctions, as no cash benefi t recipient can avoid activity of some kind (even if it is 
just a weekly 30-minute phone call with a mentor). At least in theory, refusing this will provide an 
opportunity to sanction.
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Figure 1. Organisational structure of the sanction process in the municipalities
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Th e two municipalities (A and B) are both organised along the lines described 
above. However, they have made local adjustments, which we consider to be likely 
contributors to their high level of economic sanctions. In both municipalities there is 
a high degree of specialisation and separation of competences between the Jobcentres, 
Cash Benefi t Offi  ces and activation projects. Th e separation divides the responsibility 
for imposing sanctions between the individual units. First, the Jobcentre caseworker 
carries out an assessment of whether or not the client can participate in an activation 
project. Second, the professional at the particular activation project reports the client’s 
absence, and, fi nally, the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce withholds the benefi t payment, but has 
no direct contact with the client.
Th is separation between an assessment of the client and the withholding of 
benefi t constitutes an example of how the responsibility for economic sanctions is 
distributed between units. In Municipality B, the Head of Department describes the 
organisational structure as follows: ‘Offi  cially we cannot make rules for how to apply 
the discretion, so obviously we are not doing that. On the other hand, we do have 
some rules about who can do what. What we have done in relation to the economic 
sanctions is not to involve the caseworker in the issue of non-attendance and absence 
from an activity. Th is means that once a caseworker has assigned somebody to an 
activity, the actual monitoring and report on absence is between the activity and the 
Cash Benefi t Offi  ce’ (Head of Department, Municipality B).
So the administration of economic sanctions in Municipality B relies on the 
distance between the authority imposing the sanctions (the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce) and 
the client and, at the same time, on automatic procedures. Each time a municipality 
intends to impose an economic sanction the client will be sent a letter so that he or 
she has a chance to respond. If the client does not respond to the letter, the authority 
imposes the sanction. When the client does respond and provides an explanation for 
the absence, the municipality has to assess whether the explanation is satisfactory. 
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Th e separation of tasks in relation to the economic sanctions is considered pivotal in 
the municipalities. A supervising caseworker from Municipality B explains: ‘We have 
a sharp division of labour. Of course we do the casework, but it is in the Cash Benefi t 
Offi  ce that the fi nal decision about sanctioning is made. We believe that by separating 
the two it becomes more straightforward. Th e citizen cannot just call and say: “Well, I 
just couldn’t make it”. No, if you are not ill, you are not on leave, or your child is not ill, 
then there is no [valid] explanation as to why you are not attending your activity. Th ey 
have fi rmer boundaries on this in the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce, where they do not know 
the citizen. Th e citizen that we assign to activities needs to live up to the demands 
and call in sick and things like that. So we believe there is a benefi t in separating the 
two things, to stand fi rm on the sanctioning. We want to use the sanctions, because 
we believe it creates trustworthiness. Once you have agreed to attend an activity, well, 
then one of the demands is to become responsible, to attend or at least to call in sick.’ 
(Supervising caseworker, Municipality B).
Th e quotation above illustrates how the caseworker plays no direct part in the 
sanctioning process. Once the client is attending an activity programme, any absence 
is reported directly to the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce. Th e Cash Benefi t Offi  ce then proceeds 
to withhold the benefi t payment. One of the caseworkers interviewed suggests that the 
caseworkers’ separation from the sanctioning process can lead to a higher number of 
sanctions: ‘Th e employees in the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce are clerical staff , and they just 
think: “Well, if someone has been absent then I shall withhold the money”. Where I 
believe that when a citizen calls his caseworker, who knows the life story of the citizen, 
the caseworker might be more likely to just say: “Well alright, never mind this time”. 
I believe the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce is applying more consequences because they don’t 
know the citizen – what their problems are – they have just received a note which says 
“absence” and then they withhold the money.” (Caseworker, Municipality B).
Th is caseworker’s perception is mirrored in the following statement by an employee 
at the Cash Benefi t Offi  ce in Municipality A: ‘I don’t really go into whether it is good 
or bad or whether it [sanctioning] has an eff ect. If it’s been decided that it’s something 
we should do, then we do it. We are not supposed to feel or think – that’s the way 
it is in the cash benefi t area – it’s a bit stricter and we apply the legislation without 
compromising.’ (Employee at Cash Benefi t offi  ce, Municipality A). According to our 
mapping of the infrastructure and the informants’ perception the organisational 
division of labour facilitates the high use of sanctions. Th is is shown in Figure 2, 
below. Note that the diff erence with Figure 1 is the lack of connection/communication 
between the Jobcentre and the activation project.
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Figure 2. Organisational structure of sanctions in Municipality A and B
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Th e managers and Caseworkers in the two municipalities explained and justifi ed 
the active use of economic sanctions in the municipalities in a number of diff erent 
ways. One explanation was contradictory with reference to diff erent bureaucratic 
and professional norms. At the local level the management praised the caseworkers’ 
professional values and highlighted them as a safeguard against unjustifi ed decisions. 
Other responses either justifi ed sanctions, displayed pride with sanctions or excused 
sanctions. Below we illustrate these patterns in the data using quotes from interviewees.
5.3. CONTRADICTORY JUSTIFICATIONS
One manager stated: ‘I have never experienced a situation where we have been too 
strict [made a citizen attend an activity he was not fi t for]. Th e social workers make the 
assessments, and they are really good at making a correct professional welfare assessment. 
We have high ethical standards in our work and high professional standards.’ (Team 
Leader, Municipality A). Th is manager used the social workers’ professional values (as 
opposed to the professional values of clerical staff ) to substantiate her argument about 
how they were never too strict with clients and did not impose unjust sanctions. However, 
the same manager repeatedly stressed how the employees should not be allowed to 
exercise discretion when deciding whether or not to apply economic sanctions. She 
argued that, in their organisation, it is considered an off ence if they did not use the 
economic sanctions available. She said: ‘As a general rule I don’t think you should be 
allowed to use discretion because it simply makes it too hard for the caseworkers. I 
mean, illegal absence is illegal absence [if the client is not attending their activities and 
does not have a medical certifi cate it is illegal absence and they can be subjected to 
economic sanctions]. Based on their match category, we have assigned activities to them 
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that they are able to attend, even though they might have very few resources’ (Team 
Leader, Municipality A). Th is manager regarded compliance with organisational rules 
as the main priority for her staff . Such a view runs counter to what would normally 
be considered professionalism, which can be defi ned by the professional’s right to 
exercise discretion in a particular area (Molander and Terum 2010). Bearing in mind 
our preceding analysis, it also appears that the organisational infrastructure facilitates 
a bureaucratic approach to the client, that is, an approach primarily concerned with 
procedures and regulations. One could argue that the manager expressed contradictory 
justifi cations: on the one hand, the caseworker’s correct and professional assessment 
served as a legitimate basis for the use of sanctions, which implies the positive recognition 
of the caseworker’s professionalism. However, in the case of sanctions she made 
assumptions about the very same professional’s ability to exercise discretion (‘It is too 
hard on the caseworkers’), thus promoting their predominantly bureaucratic approach. 
Th e responses of the caseworkers illustrate similar contradictions, this time between 
the overall aim of sanctions (to promote clients’ exit from welfare benefi ts, preferably to 
work) and a professional social work norm of helping people cope with undesirable life 
situations. A caseworker says: ‘No, they [the sanctioned cash benefi t recipients] do not 
necessarily become more self-supporting. It may make them more responsible. Th ey 
have to understand that cash benefi t is a temporary benefi t. If a person feels responsible 
for the duties they have, it can help them to move on’ (Caseworker, Municipality B).
5.4. JUSTIFYING SANCTIONS WITH SOCIAL WORK NORMS
When a caseworker was asked what an economic sanction was, she explained it as a 
means to establish contact with the clients. A caseworker in municipality A said: ‘It’s 
not like they will sober up from one day to the next just because we cut their benefi ts, 
but it might make them pop in so we can get them to start alcohol treatment, activation 
or something else’. In addition, she used consideration for the client as the justifi cation 
for sanctions. In Municipality B the picture appears to be very similar. Caseworkers 
saw the use of sanctions as a way to get in contact with the client if all else failed: ‘an 
economic sanction is our tool to get in contact with the citizen, if we can’t otherwise 
get in contact with them’ (Caseworker, Municipality B). Th e caseworker in this 
example argued that sanctions provide a tool for helping clients, since clients cannot 
receive the help they need if they choose not to communicate with the caseworkers. 
Th e sanction, or perhaps rather the threat of a sanction, appears to be seen by some 
of the caseworkers as a possible wake-up call for clients. Th e use of sanctions is also 
justifi ed by the caseworkers by referring to respect for the client. ‘I have this one addict 
(…) I believe he is able to come to meetings and he does show up. Th ey just need to 
have the respect. Th ey have to know that this is a job that I do – otherwise I might as 
well be a robot – it is because I mean well. I have to know if they need help, if they have 
an addiction, so yes, they do get deducted [i.e. their cash benefi t is removed]. Th e same 
rules apply to them.’ (Caseworker, Municipality A). Th e use of sanctions is justifi ed 
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by caseworkers with reference to getting into contact with clients, helping them, as a 
wake-up call or as showing them respect. All of these justifi cations are based on the 
assumption that the sanction makes the client interact with the caseworker, but do not 
address the cases in which a sanction makes the client leave welfare altogether or may 
lead to unintentional consequences (such as crime, borrowing money, building debt, 
etc.). One caseworker implicitly addresses this by saying: ‘I really wonder how people 
can live without benefi ts for months. Th ey must be doing something else. People with 
drug problems ‒ I really wonder how they get by’ (Caseworker, Municipality A).
5.5. PROUD OF SANCTIONS
Another caseworker described why he believes this particular Jobcentre has one of the 
highest levels of economic sanctions: ‘It is better organised. It runs administratively. It is 
not random whether the caseworkers use the sanctions or not’ (Caseworker, Municipality 
A). Th e same caseworker explained how the management aff ected his attitude to using the 
sanctions: ‘Clients have to be sanctioned. It is communicated at the meetings. Obviously, 
it has an impact on my work. I have to understand what the norm is here. For instance, I 
wouldn’t sanction everybody, if the general attitude was against sanctions.’ However, later 
in the interview when asked about his scope for discretion in regards to whether a client 
should be sanctioned or not, he stated that: ‘I feel I have a lot of possibilities. I can write 
my way through it. Normally I can decide if they shouldn’t be sanctioned. It’s not like 
you have to use the sanctions’ (Caseworker, Municipality A). Th e quote illustrates that, 
even though the caseworker perceived his room for discretion as large, the management 
aff ected the way he used it (‘I have to understand what the norm is here’). According 
to the caseworker, the organisational infrastructure supported a bureaucratic approach. 
Th is allowed them to be at ‘the top’ of the ranking in the Jobcentre. At the same time he 
stated that there was considerable scope for the exercise of discretion.
5.6. EXCUSING OR DISAGREEING WITH SANCTIONS
Th e development in ALMP reforms have moved towards a stronger element of 
governance and now focus on the operational aspects of policy implementation (Larsen 
2013). One of the arguments for this in Denmark has been the resistance of street level 
bureaucracies towards a work-fi rst oriented practice. Although this resistance is far from 
pervasive in the interview data, some signs of resistance towards the use of economic 
sanctions can be identifi ed data (from caseworkers in Municipalities A and B).
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When analysing the data from the two municipalities in which sanctions were used 
frequently, it appears that external pressure in the form of diff erent possibilities for 
Dorte Caswell and Matilde Høybye-Mortensen
48 Intersentia
performance measurement and bench-marking has impacted on the municipalities’ way 
of organising the work – the sanctioning regime is both visible in the rhetoric and on the 
practical level (the organisational infrastructure) in the two municipalities. Th e reshaping 
of the conditions of work resulted not only from the sanctions directed at the clients, but 
also from the sanctions directed at the municipal organisational level. Th ese sanctions 
were more subtle and included, for instance, the process of ‘naming and shaming’. Both 
can be seen as aspects of accountability, and thus of holding both the citizens and the 
street-level caseworkers to account. Th is argument is similar to that of van Berkel (2013), 
who argued that activation policies can be seen to work in three ways: they activate the 
client, they activate the organisation and they activate the frontline workers.
Workers and managers responded to these conditions by giving diff erent forms of 
explanation and justifi cation. Th e organisational routines and infrastructure mainly 
served to justify sanctions from a bureaucratic perspective, one primarily concerned 
with procedures and regulations, while organisational practice was simultaneously 
justifi ed by references to professional norms and values. One contradictory explanation 
refers to both bureaucratic and professional norms. Th is can be seen in the way in which 
management praised the caseworkers as the safeguards of ethical considerations where 
no client with substantial social problems is unjustly sanctioned. At the same time, the 
organisation trumped the caseworker for more effi  cient implementation of economic 
sanctions. Other responses either justifi ed sanctions, displayed pride with sanctions 
or excused sanctions. We argue in line with Soss et al. (2011b) that the caseworkers 
might have a hard time as they are seen as guarantors of high ethical standards, and, at 
the same time, their room for discretion is ‘under attack’ from their own management. 
Th eir professional norms might be contested by the organisational infrastructure, or 
possibly transformed by it. Th e dilemma present in these confl icting norms around 
the use of economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients mirrors a dilemma found 
by Soss et al. in their study of case managers’ use of discretion and sanctions: while 
identifying positively with the labour market orientation and performance measures 
inherent in the policy towards the unemployed, they resist the ‘…dehumanizing force 
that threatens their commitment to a more caring and responsive vision of social 
service’ (Soss et al., 2011b: 222). A similar point is made by Schram and Silverman 
(2012) that, within the political framework of welfare to work, human service 
providers are required to ‘not only discipline their clients but also staff  in ways that 
call into question their ability to act consistently with the most altruistic ideals of the 
helping professions’ (Schram and Silverman 2012: 129). We wish to nuance this point 
as we, in our material, see arguments from the helping professions that are used to 
justify and explain sanctions, so, at least on a symbolic level, the professionalism of 
social work still enjoys respect. Th is can, however, be an expression of hypocrisy, as 
pointed out by Nils Brunsson (1989).
Møller and Stone (2012) have analysed caseworkers’ perspectives on the active 
labour policy paradigm in Denmark. Th ey argue that norms are changing and that 
sanctions have played a part in that change. Th ey claim that ‘…sanctions pressure 
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caseworkers to accept new norms of active labour policy’ (Møller and Stone 2012: 
16). Th e legitimisation of the use of sanctions represents a new organisational norm 
which is refl ected in our study; one in which management applies a diff erent – and 
stricter – interpretation of the legislation. Th is supports Brodkin’s point: ‘…what 
street-level organizations do in the name of policy is not limited to what formal policy 
would seem to require’ (Brodkin 2011: 200). Traditionally research on street-level 
bureaucracy has mainly focused on the ways in which street-level bureaucracies fall 
short in implementing policy. One might pose the question: to what extent do street-
level organisations go beyond the legislation such as the case seems to be when it 
comes to the use of economic sanctions in Denmark?
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